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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Case.
Respondents John and Julie McVicars' ("McVicars") reasonable enjoyment oftheir lives
and "dream home," built by John McVicars in 1991 on a five (5) acre parcel in Nez Perce
County and thoroughly enjoyed by family and friends since that time, has been unreasonably
interfered with by the "cumulative effect" of Appellants Bret and Eddieka Christensen
("Christensens") uses, beginning in 2007, of a portion of their ten (10) acre parcel lying adjacent
and due west of McVicars' home. See Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 1. The trial court made thorough
and extensive findings of fact demonstrating that this "cumulative effect" of: (i) Christensens'
optional placement10ftheir enormous, translucent fabric building, over 120 feet wide by 260 feet
long and 50 feet tall, that "glows" at night when the lights are on, 23 feet from McVicars'
property line, 60 feet from McVicars' pool and patio and approximately 90 feet from McVicars'
then sixteen year old home, conduct which the trial court concluded "is unreasonably offensive
to the senses," (ii) Christensens' construction of a roadway along McVicars' property line
resulting in substantial traffic and the centralizing of Christensens' ranchlhorse operation to the
area directly behind McVicars' home, (iii) the unpredictable usage pattern and bright,
illuminating effect of the building's lights and the unpredictable, sometimes constant, sound
from the building's indoor and outdoor speakers caused by the amplifying "stereo effect" from
the building'S composition and lack of insulation, (iv) the increased amount of vehicular and
pedestrian traffic from Christensens' expanding hay sales out ofthe building to the public and
from individuals who stable horses and who access the building to retrieve hay and/or to ride
("The Court is not persuaded that this is the only location on the Defendants' property that the building could
have been placed. It is not lost upon this Court that the building is placed upon the Defendants' property in a
manner that is least obtrusive to the overall appearance of the Defendants' property. However, the site was
selected with little or no consideration of the impact the building might have on the neighbors." R., Vol. n, p.

267)
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horses, all of which generates excessive dust and noise and adds to McVicars' loss of privacy
and (v) accumulation of manure directly behind McVicars' home from animals raised and kept
on Christensens' property resulting in offensive odor and flies; are clear evidence that
Christensens' use of their property to the west of McVicars' home constitutes a private nuisance.
R., Vol. II, pp. 238-255, 266-277.
The trial court considered, at length, what an adequate remedy should be and stated that,
while to abate this private nuisance, under the circumstances of this case, an "award of damages
in the amount of $217,000 is supported by the record .... simply awarding damages is not an
adequate remedy which would fully compensate" MeVicars, as they would be left with the
"onus" to sell their house which could be "difficult, ifnot impossible." R., Vol. II, p. 283. The
trial court also analyzed whether injunctive relief could "abate the nuisance by limiting activities
which create odor, dust, traffic, noise and light," and noted that if damages were awarded and
activities were abated, "the expense to the Defendants would be significant." The trial court then
concluded that adequate abatement of the nuisance, short of requiring Christensens to relocate
their building, "is not feasible" in that "[ e]nforcement of these requirements could become
cumbersome and, based upon the history of the parties, would ultimately result in heightening
the dispute between these neighbors to a more intolerable level." R., Vol. II, pp. 283-258.
Having presided over six (6) days of trial and examined hundreds of exhibits, the trial
court, intimately familiar with the circumstances of this case, entered its final judgment requiring
Christensens to remove the fabric building from its location behind McVicars' home, prohibiting
relocation of the fabric building and centralization of the horse operation on any portion of
Christensens' property lying west of McVicars' property and limiting traffic west of MeVicars'
property to vehicles personally owned by Christensens.
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Course of Proceedings.
McVicars filed a Complaint against Christensens in July, 2007 and an Amended
Complaint in December, 2009. R. Vol. I, pp. 15 and 93. Christens ens filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment in October, 2009 and filed an amended motion for summary judgment later.
R. Vol. I, p. 29. The trial court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendants'
Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 12, 2010, and, in pertinent part, (i)
declined to preclude McVicars from pursuing at trial the remedy of dismantling the building and
(ii) denied Christensens' motion to dismiss the public nuisance claim for the reason questions of
material fact remain with regard to whether the fabric building was used by the public and
whether the fabric building was a public nuisance. R. Vol. I, p. 106-114. A six (6) day court trial
took place August 30, August 31, September 1, September 2, September 3, and October 8, 2010.
Tr. Vol. I and II. The district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
on February 8,2011 and an Amended Final Judgment on September 2,2011, which ordered,
adjudged and decreed: (i) judgment be entered that Christensens' use of their real property west
ofMcVicars' real property constitutes a nuisance, (ii) a mandatory injunction be entered
requiring Christensens to remove the fabric building from its current location by no later than
August 1,2011, (iii) to eliminate and fully abate the cumulative effect of the noise, dust, traffic,
lights, odor and building placement issues constituting this private nuisance, a permanent
injunction be entered prohibiting Christens ens (a) from relocating the fabric building or any
portion of the fabric building on any portion of Christensens' property that lies to the west of
McVicars' property, (b) from centralizing Christensens' horse operation on any portion of
Christensens' property that lies to the west ofMcVicars' property, (c) from driving vehicles that
are not personally owned by Christensens and/or allowing vehicles that are not personally owned
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by Christensens to be driven on Christensens' property that lies to the west ofMcVicars'
property, and (iv) the claim of public nuisance be dismissed. R. Vol. II., pp. 285-286 and 288289. McVicars and Christensens both filed motions for attorney fees and costs on the basis that
each party claimed to have prevailed in the action. The trial court, in the exercise of its
discretion, determined that neither party had prevailed over the other and denied the parties'
motions for awards of attorney fees and concluded that neither party had pursued or brought
claims frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation and denied the parties' motions for
awards of costs. R. Vol. II, pp. 319-24.
Statement of Facts
McVicars' Home and Property
John and Julie McVicars purchased their property, constructed their residence and
became neighbors to Lisa and Orie Kaltenbaugh in 1991. R. Vol. II, p. 232, ~ 5. The McVicars'
placed their home centrally upon their property, with a pool and patio area to the southwest of
the home. R. Vol. II, p. 232-33, ~ 6. The home was designed and constructed to insulate and
protect the McVicars from road noise on Thiessen Road; all of the private places are in the
backyard. R. Vol. II, p. 233, ~ 6, Tr. Vol. I, p. 593, L. 2-6. The property is bordered, by what
became Christensens' property in 2003, on the north and west sides. R. Vol. II, p. 231. The
grounds surrounding the house are neatly landscaped, and provided the McVicars with a peaceful
and pleasant atmosphere to entertain themselves and their family members. R. Vol. II, p. 232-33,
~ 6.

The McVicars peaceably lived in and enjoyed their home and its surroundings and hosted

many family events for 15 years before the Christens ens constructed the enormous fabric
building and concentrated their horse and hay operations directly behind the McVicars' pool and
patio area. R. Vol. II, p. 231, Tr. Vol. I, p. 366, L. 2-6. During the time Kaltenbaughs owned the
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neighboring property, they maintained the portion west of the McVicars' property, located
behind McVicars' pool and patio, as a lush irrigated green pasture. R. Vol. II, p. 233, ~ 9, Tr.
Vol. I, p. 401, L. 18-23. McVicars' daughter was married in McVicars' backyard and had
wedding pictures taken in that beautiful pasture. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 204 and 205. Orie
Kaltenbaugh testified that he and his wife could not have had better neighbors than McVicars.
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 9-14. Orie Kaltenbaugh, who was a surgeon, raised llamas, emus, long hom
cattle, among other animals, as a home occupation, and had placed animal feeders at the north
end of their property, near Tammany Creek Road, to alleviate the potential of odors affecting his
home and McVicars' home. He also spread manure amongst his pastures for fertilizer. R. Vol.
II, p. 233

~

8 and 9.

McVicars operated a construction business from a garage/shop on their property. Orie
Kaltenbaugh testified he hardly knew there was a construction business there. R. Vol. II, p. 234,
~ 4.

Orie Kaltenbaugh had constructed a pole building that lay partially on McVicars' property as

a result of a gentlemen's agreement between them. In 2003, before Kaltenbaugh sold his
property to Christensens, McVicars purchased the land upon which the pole building sat and
started a granite shop. John McVicars insulated the pole building to reduce the sound resonating
from the granite saw and had Orie Kaltenbaugh stand on his porch to listen. The sound was no
louder than traffic on Tammany Road. R. Vol. II, p. 234, ~ 10-12. McVicars relocated the granite
business in 2008. R. Vol. II, p. 235, ~ 13.
Christensens' Use of their Property Between 2003 and 2006
In 2003, Bret and Eddieka Christensen {"Christensens") purchased the Kaltenbaugh
property. R. Vol. II, p. 235, ~ 14. Initially, Christensens used this pasture for their 50 horses. R.
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Vol. II, p. 236, ~ 16. The McVicars' had no problem with Christensens' use of their property to
graze horses on the irrigated grass behind their home, pool and patio. Tr. Vol. I, p. 592, L. 8-14.
Christensens' Use of their Property in 2006 and Thereafter
Christensens destroyed this pasture in 2006, when they graded and leveled the area west
of the McVicars' property and constructed a noninsulated fabric covered building, 120 feet wide,
260 feet long and over 50 feet high at the peak, sited within 23 feet of the McVicars' property
line, 60 feet from the McVicars' pool and patio area, and approximately 90 feet from the
McVicars' home. R. Vol. II, p. 236-239, ~ 18, 24, 28, Tr. Vol. I, p. 402, L. 6-25. The fabric
building is one of the largest structures in the area and is significantly larger than the McVicars'
home. R. Vol. II, p. 239, ~ 29,30. Julie McVicars testified that the size of the building is massive
and that it feels like a 747 hovering over whenever she is doing anything outside, in the garden,
doing the yard work, walking or jogging up the road. Tr. Vol. I, p. 593, L. 17-21. Although there
are two (2) other large structures in the Tammany Creek area, the Lewiston Roundup and Lucky
Acres, these structures have existed for over 25 years and were not placed in close proximity to
their neighbors as was the Christensens' building. R. Vol. II, p. 239,

~ 29,30.

In their siting permit for the fabric building, the Christens ens indicated that the intended
agricultural use of the building was as an indoor riding arena/stables. R. Vol. II, p. 236, ~ 18. Pat
Rockefeller, the Nez Perce County building official, testified that Bret represented that the
building was for personal use, including storing hay for personal use. R. Vol. II, p. 236, ~ 19.
Notwithstanding these assertions by Mr. Christensen, since its construction, the building is
constantly used by the public. R. Vol. II, p. 240-41, 246-47, 251-52, ~ 33,34,37,54,57,58, 71,
75, 76. Initially, the most prevalent use was for horse clinics advertised at the arena. R. Vol. II, p.
251. The most prevalent public use of the building is now generated from the commercial hay
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sales as Christens ens display a "Hay For Sale" sign that can be viewed from Tammany Creek
Road. R. Vol. II, p. 252, ~ 76.
The McVicars were unaware the fabric building was being constructed until the day the
trucks and crew arrived and constructed it. R. Vol. II, p. 237, ~ 22. John McVicars was finally
able to speak with Mr. Christensen about the building three days after its construction. R. Vol. II,
p. 238, ~ 25. Mr. Christensen told John McVicars "I can do what I want with my property-you
can do what you want with your property." R. Vol. II, p. 238, ~ 25. The fabric building was sited
at the southernmost point ofthe Christensens' property and directly behind the McVicars pool
and patio area. R. Vol. II, p. 239-40, ~ 31.
Christensens' Use ofthe Fabric Building and Property
Even though Mr. Christensen said that his horse operation is smaller because the
Christensens now own 15 horses compared to the 50 horses they previously owned; the overall
character oftheir horse/ranching operation has increased and become concentrated directly
behind the McVicars' property as a result of the placement of the fabric building. R. Vol. II, p.
240, ~ 32,33. The Christensens' operations out of the fabric building and surrounding property
include maintenance of horse stables, rental of horse stables, access to the horse stables, access to
the indoor arena, access to feed horses, facilities to raise pigs, and sale of hay to the public. R.
Vol. II, p. 240, ~ 33,34,37. The most prevalent public use of the building is generated from the
commercial hay sales. R. Vol. II, p. 250, ~ 76.
The fabric building contains 36, or two banks of 18, interior 400 watt lights and exterior
lights on the north and south ends of the building. R. Vol. II, p. 241, ~ 38. A witness compared
the fabric building to a circus tent and stated that the fabric building is very bright at night. R.
Vol. II, p. 255, ~ 84, Tr. Vol. II, p. 776, L. 13-16. When the lights are on past 9:00 p.m., the
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entire building glows causing the interior of McVicars' home to be illuminated, which disrupts
the McVicars' sleep as their bedroom faces westward. R. Vol. II, p. 242, ~ 39,40, Tr. Vol., p.
593, L. 22-24. At night, headlights from vehicles often shine into McVicars' home. R. Vol. 71,

p. 246, ~ 54.
The fabric building also contains a sound system with four interior speakers and exterior
speakers. R. Vol. II, p. 243, ~ 45. Christensens' use of the speakers disrupts McVicars' telephone
conversations in their home, constantly invades McVicars' pool and patio area, and disturbs the
McVicars' family events. R. Vol. II, p. 244-455, ~ 45,51,53. John McVicars testified that the
arena inside noise is like a megaphone. Tr. Vol. I., p. 431, L. 19. Julie McVicars testified that
music can often be heard inside the McVicars' home with the doors and windows closed. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 595, L. 4-7. She testified that music carries right onto their patio, disturbing
conversation and make quiet time impossible. Tr. Vol. I., p. 595, L. 8-15.
Although the maintenance of the Christensens' property or the Christensens use of their
property might be consistent with the general use of properties in the Tammany Creek area, the
difference is that the Christensens' building is unusually large and invites substantial traffic
traveling in and out of their property directly over a roadway constructed along the McVicars'
property line. R. Vol. II, p. 256-58, ~ 88,91,94. Christensens' and others' use of the fabric
building and the traffic to and away from the fabric building generates excessive dust and noise
and greatly disturbs the McVicars. R. Vol. II, p. 247-48, ~ 58,59. Christens ens placement of
additional gravel to the roadway, installation of a fence, and planting of arbor vitae bushes have
not eliminated the generation of dust from the roadway. R. Vol. II, p. 248, ~ 60. John McVicars
testified that he goes home to listen to what seems like highway traffic. Tr. Vol. I., p. 431, L. 2225. Mr. McVicars testified that his wife, Julie, has mentioned at least 100 times that she can no
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longer sit out on her patio and read a book because ofthe noise from fans running in the building
and traffic noise. Tr. Vol. I, p. 433, L. 1-3. Julie McVicars testified that approximately seven to
eight times every day on average a motor vehicle drives along their backyard to the building and
back which amount to approximately 5,000 motorized vehicle trips annually on the roadway next
to the McVicars' property line. Tr. Vol. I, p. 607, L. 21-25, p. 60S, L. l.
Odor, dust and flies have accumulated from the horse operation in the area behind the
McVicars' home. Odor is especially prevalent from manure piles which are located not far from
the McVicars' bedroom window. R. Vol. II, p. 249, ~ 64. In the summer, the odor from the
manure, horses, and pigs is heightened, and is especially noticeable from the McVicars' patio
and through their windows. R. Vol. II, p. 250, ~ 67. Julie McVicars testified about manure piles
behind the house, the pig pen in the shed behind the house, and the odor that carries onto the
pool and patio area and into their home from the animals, their waste, and the flies that
accompany. Tr. Vol. I, p. 625, L. 3-25. Julie McVicars testified that the manure behind the
McVicars' home is cleaned up only once or twice a year. Tr. Vol. p. 625, L. 1-2. Julie McVicars
testified that in the summer months when they are trying to enjoy their patio there is a constant
odor. Tr. Vol. I, p. 625, L. 5-9.
Interference with McVicars' Use and Enjoyment
The character of the McVicars' home is changed because of the fabric building; it is no
longer pristine and peaceful with beautiful views but dusty, noisy and obnoxious. R. Vol. IT, p.
255,

~

S5, Tr. Vol. II, p. 756, L. 2-4, p. 757, L. 3-S. The McVicars patio and pool area is no

longer a private area because ofthe use ofthe fabric building behind the McVicars' home. R.
Vol. II, p. 254, ~ SO. Several witnesses testified that the McVicars cannot enjoy the patio and
pool area and can no longer host family events at their home because of the interference from
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traffic, dust, flies, smell of pigs and horses, and noise from inside the fabric building. R. Vol. II,
p. 253-54, '78, 79, Tr. Vol. II, p. 768, L. 20-23, p. 777, L. 23-25, p. 778, L. 1-15. John
McVicars testified that nine times out of ten when he and his wife try to enjoy an evening outside
on their patio they are bothered by traffic, dust, smell of pigs or horses. Tr. Vol. p. 431, L. 12-15.
Julie McVicars testified that she rarely opens her bedroom windows, rarely has family functions
at her home anymore, and that whenever they do use the patio they have to wash off the
furniture, table, patio floor, windows, driveways and sidewalks. Tr. Vol. p. 611, L. 16-23, p. 612,
L. 16-19. Julie McVicars testified that before the construction of the building the McVicars'

family members would gather at their home for almost all birthdays, anniversaries, and father's
days. Tr. Vol. I, p. 611, L. 24-25, p. 612, L. 1-3.
Adverse Impacts to the McVicars' Health
The McVicars' health is adversely affected by the fabric building; Julie McVicars feels
stress, loss of sleep, distress that she does not want to stay in her home, frustration, and a desire
to leave the home on weekends to escape the situation. R. Vol. II, p. 254, , 81. John McVicars
feels stress and frustration because ofthe fabric building. R. Vol. II, p. 254, ,81. John McVicars
testified that his blood pressure is elevated due to stress and his wife sought medical attention
due to the stress caused by the Christens ens actions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 433, L. 22-25, p. 434, L. 2-5.
Julie McVicars testified that in December 2007 she sought medical attention for considerable
chest pain that was determined to be stress related. Tr. Vol. I, p. 629, L. 3-6. Julie McVicars also
testified that it is very difficult for her to sleep at night and consequently she began taking
medication to sleep in early 2007. Tr. Vol. I., p. 629, L. 6-13.
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Monetary Damages Related to McVicars' Property Value
Jennifer Menegas, a real estate agent familiar with the Lewiston, Idaho market, estimated
that before the construction of the fabric building, the McVicars' property had a value between
$1.3 and $1.6 million. Tr. Vol. II, p. 756, L. 8-16. Ms. Menegas testified that the construction of
the fabric building has devalued the McVicars' property approximately twenty-five to thirty
percent and that it would be difficult, ifnot impossible to sell their house because of the adverse
impact ofthe Christensens' building and its uses. R. Vol. II, p. 256, ~ 87, Tr. Vol. II, p. 757, L.
16-25. Terry Rudd, a real estate appraiser, concluded that the McVicars' property had a loss in
value of26 percent attributable to the presence and use of the building that amounted to
$217,000. R. Vol. II, p. 255-56, ~ 86, Tr. Vol. I, p. 669, L. 6-16.
Continuing Conflict and Friction Between the Parties
Before John McVicars knew Christensens were planning to construct an arena-type
building, John McVicars gave Christens ens permission for vehicles to cross McVicars' pasture
to enclose what John thought was going to be an outdoor riding area. McVicars pasture was
damaged, MeVicars sent a $600 bill to Christens ens and that bill has not been paid. R. Vol. II, p.
237, ~ 21,22,23. John McVicars testified that when the building was first being constructed and
he tried to get Mr. Christensen to stop construction, Mr. Christensen told him that he had a
permit and he could do what he wanted with his property. Tr. Vol. I, p. 411, L. 2-3. Julie
McVicars testified that whenever she made a request to Mr. Christensen to abate noise, remove
the manure piles or reduce the amount of traffic the response she received from Christens ens was
"to file a complaint." Tr. Vol. I, p. 563, L. 17-21. Julie testified the lights on the building had
been left on past 9:00 p.m. approximately 222 times. John McVicars testified that when the
issues with the building started he heard about internet comments being made that he was
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grinding granite all day and night. Tr. Vol. I, p. 385, L. 6-22. Mr. McVicars testified that there
was some recourse by Christens ens whenever he complained about their actions. Tr. Vol. I, p.

396, L. 23-25, p. 397, L. 1-2. One evening the McVicars called the sheriff regarding the lights
and in response to this complaint, Christens ens told the officer he could leave the lights on all
night ifhe desired, ignored the officer's advice and left the lights on all night. R. Vol. II, p. 242-

43, ,42. Over time, McVicars made numerous calls to the sheriff to deal with noise, lights and
dust issues. Mr. McVicars testified that after Christensens placed stables on the north property
line that he brought the issue to the attention of the County and the County ordered Christens ens
to move them; the next day directly behind the McVicars' house were 20 temporary panel corrals
with a big sign saying future home of Bar Double Dot Stables. R. Vol. II, p. 241, ,35, Tr. Vol. I,
p. 417, L. 7-15, p. 618, L. 14-25. In October, 2007 deputies responded to a noise complaint and
when they arrived, John McVicars and Mr. Christensen were in a confrontation in front of the
arena. R. Vol. II, p. 244, ,49.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the district court properly find clear evidence and conclude that the cumulative effect
of the size, placement and uses of the Christensens' fabric building and centralizing of
Christensens' horse operation in close proximity to McVicars' property and home
unreasonably interferes with McVicars' lives and property and constitutes a private
nuisance?

B.

Did the district court properly grant a mandatory injunction requiring Christensens to
remove the fabric building from its current location on Christensens' property no later
than August 1, 2011 ?

C.

Did the district court properly grant a permanent injunction to eliminate the cumulative
effect of the issues constituting this private nuisance by prohibiting Christensens from
relocating the fabric building, centralizing Christensens' horse operation and driving or
allowing vehicles not owned by Christens ens to be driven; on any portion of
Christensens' property that lies west ofMcVicars' property?

D.

Did the district court properly find and conclude that the Right to Farm Act does not
apply to the circumstances of this case?
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E.

Did the district court properly find and conclude that the clean hands doctrine does not
apply to the circumstances of this case?

F.

Did the district court properly deny Christensens' motion for an award of attorney fees
and costs at trial?

G.

Should McVicars be awarded their attorney fees on appeal under Rules 40 and/or 41
I.A.R. and Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1)?
ARGUMENT

A. The district court properly found clear evidence and concluded that the cumulative effect of
the size, placement and uses of the Christensens' fabric building and centralizing of
Christensens' horse operation in close proximity to McVicars' property and home
unreasonably interferes with McVicars' lives and property and constitutes a private nuisance.
Idaho Code § 52-101 defines nuisance as "[a]nything which is injurious to health or morals,
or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment oflife or property ... [.J" A public nuisance is "one which
affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be
unequal." I.C. § 52-102. A private nuisance is "[e]verynuisance not defined bylaw as a public
nuisance or a moral nuisance[.J" I.C. § 52-107.
The district court set forth and considered the elements that a plaintiff must prove to
establish a nuisance (i) that plaintiff owns on interest in land or the buildings (structures) on land,
(ii) that the defendant has engaged in a course of conduct which is unreasonably injurious to the
health, or is unreasonably offensive to the senses, or obstructs plaintiffs free use of his land or
buildings; (iii) that, under all the circumstances, the defendant's course of conduct unreasonably
interferes with the plaintiffs enjoyment of his property or with the enjoyment of his life while using
the property; and (iv) the nature and extent of the damages and the amount thereof R. Vol. II, pp.
262-277, citing IDJI 490.
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With respect to the district court's nuisance determination, the proper standard of review
is whether such determination was based on substantial and competent evidence. Crea v. Crea,
135 Idaho 246, 249, 16 P.3d 922,925 (2000). The district court's findings of fact on the bench
trial shall be liberally construed in favor ofthe district court's judgment because ofthe district
court's role as trier of fact. ld. Where findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even if
the evidence is conflicting, those findings will not be overturned on appeal. ld. Substantial
evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion; it
is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473,
478,849 P.2d 934, 939 (1993) (citation omitted). When an action is tried to a court without a
jury, determinations as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, its
probative effect and inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are all matters within the
province of the trial court. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 746, 9 P.3d
1204, 1212 (2000). The Court does not set aside a district court's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. Mays v. Davis, 132 Idaho 73, 75, 967 P.2d 275,277 (1998) (citing I.R.C.P.
52(a».
Substantial and competent evidence in this case establishes that Christensens have
created and are maintaining a nuisance by reason of the abundant testimony in the record as to
the enonnous size and closeness of the fabric building to the McVicars' property and the
presence of offensive light, noise, traffic, dust, odor and/or flies that emanate from Christensens'
use oftheir property within, near and associated with the fabric building that unreasonably
interferes with McVicars enjoyment oftheir property and enjoyment of their lives while using
their property. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 and 2, both aerial photographs, and Exhibits 35, 64, 65, 107,
118, 134 and 135 show the enormity and proximity ofthe fabric building and the horse feeding
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area behind McVicars' home. The aerial photographs also show the relationship ofMcVicars'
property and Christensens' residence, a small glimpse of which can be seen at the margin of each
aerial photograph. Exhibits 199-202 show the enormous interior space ofthe building. Exhibit 4
then shows Christensens' large front yard and pasture as viewed from Tammany Creek Road.
The horse feeding area and horse trailer parking area west of McVicars' property and the
Christensens' stables that border McVicars' north property line are depicted in Exhibits 36-40,
49,52 and 132. R. Vol. II, p.241. The intensive traffic behind McVicars' home is shown in
numerous photographs referenced in paragraph 54 of the trial court's findings. R. Vol. II, p. 246.
Exhibits 108 and 109 are representative of different forms of traffic. Invasive dust is shown in
numerous photographs as well. R. Vol. II, p. 247, ~ 58 and 59. Exhibits 65, 76, 87, 89 and 118
are examples of the dust generated next to McVicars' backyard. Manure can be shown in
photographs but odor cannot be; it can only be sensed. Again, numerous trial exhibits depict the
odor and fly problem, Exhibits 60, 75, 79 and 84 demonstrate the unreasonable and offensive
accumulation of manure that Christensens have allowed next to McVicars' yard and home.
An examination of the trial court's findings offact illustrates that the trial court, in

making its nuisance determination, took into account i) the size and placement of the fabric
building, R. Vol. II, p. 266, ii) changes in the use ofthe Christensens' property located west of
the McVicars' home, R. Vol. II, p. 268, iii) building lights and sound system, R. Vol. II, p. 269,
iv) increased traffic resulting in the loss ofMcVicars' privacy and an increased amount of dust,
R. Vol. II, p. 270, v) odor from manure piles, flies, and piled debris, R. Vol. II, p. 271, and vi)
evolution of hay sales business and concerns regarding public use ofthe building, R. Vol. II, p.
272.
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The district court detennined that the Christensens' decision to construct and place the
fabric building where they did was not reasonable. R. Vol. II, p. 266. Notwithstanding
Christensens' assertion and quotation from the trial transcript with respect to Bret's testimony
that he told John McVicars that he was planning to construct a covered arena near the McVicars'
property and that he showed John the dimensions of such arena, the district court made no such
finding. Appellants' Brief at 7, 8. Instead the district court found that "[t]he Plaintiffs were first
apprised of the fact that the Defendants were building an indoor arena when several trucks
carrying building materials for the fabric building arrived." R. Vol. II, p. 237, ~ 22.
In addition, the district court found that "this is not a case where the complainant moved
to the nuisance." R. Vol. II, p. 267. The McVicars were first in time and resided on their property
for over fifteen years. ld. "Placing a building of this magnitude in such close proximity to
McVicars' property is unreasonably offensive to the senses, and under all the circumstances
unreasonably interferes with the McVicars' enjoyment of their property. R. Vol. II, p. 267.
The district court was not influenced by Christensens' argument that the use of their
property has not changed. R. Vol. II, p. 268. The court found that the size of the building is
significant. There is a substantial increase in traffic traveling in and out of the property directly
along a new roadway along McVicars' property line. This change in use has resulted in a loss of
privacy to the McVicars and impedes their free use of their land, especially the pool and patio
area. Notwithstanding Christensens' assertion that "[a]cross the street in one direction from the
property in question is the rodeo grounds and in another direction is an outdoor riding arena," the
district court in its Findings of Fact stated that the rodeo "grounds are located some distance east
of both the Christensen and McVicars homes ... [and the outdoor arena] is a small outdoor arena
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that is located some distance to the north ofthe Christensen's residence." Appellants' Brief at 3,
R. Vol. II, p. 232,

~ 3,4,

p. 239,

~ 29,30.

The lighting in and on the building interferes with the McVicars' use and enjoyment of
their property. R. Vol. II, p. 269. The fabric building contains 36, or two banks of 18, interior
400 watt lights and exterior lights on the north and south ends of the building. R. Vol. II, p. 241,
~ 38.

A witness compared the fabric building to a circus tent and stated that the fabric building is

very bright at night. R. Vol. II, p. 255, ~ 84, Tr. Vol. II, p. 776, L.·13-16. When the lights are on
past 9:00 p.m., the invasion oflight into the McVicars' home disrupts the McVicars' sleep. R.
Vol. II, p. 242, ~ 40, Tr. Vol. I, p. 593, L. 22-24. At night, headlights from vehicles often shine
into McVicars' home. R. Vol. 71, p. 246, ~ 54.
Christensens' use of the sound system within the building interferes with the McVicars'
use and enjoyment of their property. R. Vol. II, p. 270. The constant influx of music is
unreasonably offensive to the senses and constantly invades the McVicars' home, pool and patio,
disturbs family gatherings, and disrupts conversations. R. Vol. II, p. 243, ~ 45, p. 244-455, ~ 45,
51,53. Julie McVicars testified that music can often be heard inside the McVicars' home with
the doors and windows closed. Tr. Vol. I, p. 595, L. 4-7. She testified that music carries right
onto their patio, disturbing conversation and make quiet time impossible. Tr. Vol. I., p. 595, L. 815.
Traffic and dust interferes with the McVicars' use and enjoyment of their property. R.
Vol. II, p. 270-71. Christensens' and others' use of the fabric building and the traffic to and away
from the fabric building generates excessive dust and noise and greatly disturbs the McVicars. R.
Vol. II, p. 247-48, ~ 58,59. John McVicars testified that he goes home to listen to what seems
like highway traffic. Tr. Vol. I., p. 431, L. 22-25. Mr. McVicars testified that his wife, Julie, has
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mentioned at least 100 times that she can no longer sit out on her patio and read a book because
of the noise from fans running in the building and traffic noise. Tr. Vol. I, p. 433, L. 1-3. Julie
McVicars testified that approximately seven to eight times every day on average a motor vehicle
drives along their backyard to the building and back which amounts to approximately 5,000
motorized vehicle trips annually on the roadway next to the McVicars' property line. Tr. Vol. I,
p. 607, L. 21-25, p. 608, L. 1.
There is clear evidence of odor emanating from the Christensens' property that is
offensive to the senses. R. Vol. II, p. 271. Odor, dust and flies have accumulated from the horse
operation in the area behind the McVicars' home. Odor is especially prevalent from manure piles
which are located not far from the McVicars' bedroom window. R. Vol. II, p. 249, ~ 64. In the
summer, the odor from the manure, horses, and pigs is heightened, and is especially noticeable
from the McVicars' patio and through their windows. R. Vol. II, p. 250, ~ 67. Julie McVicars
testified about manure piles behind the house, the pig pen in the shed behind the house, and the
odor that carries onto the pool and patio area and into their home from the animals, their waste
and the flies that accompany. Tr. Vol. I, p. 625, L. 3-25. Julie McVicars testified that the manure
behind the McVicars' home is cleaned up only once or twice a year. Tr. Vol. p. 625, L. 1-2. Julie
McVicars testified that in the summer months when they are trying to enjoy their patio there is a
constant odor. Tr. Vol. I, p. 625, L. 5-9.
Using the district court's findings, the conclusion made by the district court that the
Christensens' fabric building and use oftheir property is a nuisance logically follows and is
grounded in the law in Idaho. See Hansen v. Independent School Dist. No. 1 in Nez Perce

County, 61 Idaho 109,98 P.2d 959, 962 (1940) (the use ofa baseball field constitutes a nuisance
because the baseball field floods the neighbor's homes with excessive light, preventing or
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hindering sleep and rest; creates excessive noise; involves a trespass of balls and people, and
results in the parking of automobiles in such a manner as to greatly hinder ingress and egress to
the neighbor's property."); Crea, 135 Idaho at 250, 16 P.3d at 926 (The presence of offensive
odors and a copious number of flies from a neighboring hog farm was a private nuisance.);

Payne v. Skaar, 127 Idaho 341, 342, 900 P.2d 1352, 1353 (1995) (The feedlot generated odors,
dust and flies and constituted a private nuisance.)
On appeal, Christensens have neglected to challenge the evidence presented at trial that
supports the district court's findings. Instead, Christens ens argue that the trial court failed to find
the testimony Christensens offered to be credible on many issues. Because Christensens fail to
argue that the district court's determination is not supported by substantial and competent
evidence, this Court should not be persuaded that the district court failed to apply the proper
factors. Those factors are summarized in the statement of facts above and, based on the record, it
is clear that the district court's nuisance determination is based on substantial and competent
evidence and should be upheld.
B.

The district court properly granted a mandatory injunction in requiring Christens ens to
remove the fabric building from its current location on Christensens' property no later than
August 1,2011.
The trial court, having properly concluded that McVicars demonstrated by clear evidence

that this private nuisance existed, then analyzed the remedies available and their respective
application to the circumstances of this case. R. Vol. II, pp. 281-286. The trial court cited Payne

v. Skaar for the well founded proposition that "Idaho law ... provides that nuisances 'maybe
enjoined or abated, as well as damages recovered.'" Payne, 127 Idaho at 345,900 P.2d at 1356.
The trial court then cited Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 491, 129 P.3d 1235, 1240
(2006):
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Idaho Code § 52-111 states that "by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or
abated, as well as damages recovered," not "shall." Remedies for nuisance
include abatement, injunction, and damages. Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho
343, 218 P.2d 695 (1950); Koseris v. J.R. Simp/ot Co., 82 Idaho 263, 352 P.2d
235 (1960). "An injunction may issue to restrain threatened or anticipated
nuisance when it clearly appears that a nuisance will necessarily result from the
contemplated act or thing sought to be enjoined." Larsen v. Vill. of Lava Hot
Springs, 88 Idaho 64, 73, 396 P.2d 471, 476 (1964).
While the trial court found that "an award of damages in the amount of$217,000 is
supported by the record, it also concluded that monetary damages would not be "an adequate
remedy which would fully compensate [McVicars] for their injury and that "the most adequate
remedy to abate the nuisance at hand requires the [Christens ens] to relocate the building to a
different location on their property." R. Vol. II, pp. 283-284. McVicars have demonstrated
clearly, as determined by the trial court in granting this mandatory injunction, that under the
circumstances ofthis case the abatement ofthe private nuisance by requiring removal of the
fabric building from its present location is the only remedy that is fully responsive to the
nuisances that exist. R., Vol. II, p. 283-285. This is an available remedy under Idaho law.

Larsen, 88 Idaho at 73,396 P.2d at 476.
The trial court, after thoroughly analyzing the impact of removal of the building on the
''utility'' of Christensens' conduct and other factors, properly balanced the equities of this case by
ordering the Christens ens to remove the fabric building but allowing it to be relocated except to
the west of McVi cars , property line. The court did not require removal from the Christensens'
property, but rather that it be relocated. "The district court has the latitude to seek a more
equitable middle ground." Payne, 127 Idaho at 348,900 P.2d at 1359 (Entirely closing the
feedlot would be a momentous invasion of defendant's property rights). In a case of conflicting
rights, where neither party can enjoy his own property without in some measure restricting the
liberty of the other in the use of property, the law must make the best arrangement it can between
21

the contending parties, with a view to preserving to each one the largest measure ofliberty
possible under the circumstances. ld.
In this case, the trial court thoroughly explained the factors that supported its decision to
require removal of the building and allow its relocation in a different location. Those factors
included that (i) "an award of damages in the amount of$217,000 is supported by the record,"
however, that alone would not fully compensate McVicars for their injury and "the onus" would
still be on MeVicars to try to sell their house in an uncertain real estate market; (ii) removal of
the building would "result in a momentous invasion of [Christensens'] property rights; (iii)
awarding damages to McVicars and imposing injunctive relief limiting Christensens' offensive
activities would be at great expense to Christensens; (iv) enforcement of an injunction
proscribing Christensens' offensive activities would become cumbersome based on the history of
the parties and ''ultimately result in heightening the dispute before these neighbors to a more
intolerable level." Evidence of the continuing conflict and friction between the parties and Mr.
Christensen's hostile attitude is set forth in the Statement of Facts above. The trial court
concluded that "[a]batement ofthe nuisance is not feasible given the history of the parties." R.,
Vol. II, pp. 281-285. The record sets forth substantial evidence that supports this analysis and the
trial court's ultimate conclusion that the appropriate remedy is to require relocation of the
building and, with it, the centralization of Christensens' horse operation at a different location on
their property." R. Vol. II, p. 285.
Similar circumstances have resulted in similar abatement remedies in other jurisdictions.

See also, Quinn v. Am. Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co., 293 Pa. 152, 161, 141 A. 855, 858 (1928)(The
court required defendants to relocate and install their heavy machinery within the time specified,
the defendants were enjoined from operating the machinery if they failed to comply, and
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defendants were required to pay damages to plaintiff); Penland v. Redwood Sanitary Sewer

Servo Dist., 156 Or. App. 311, 321, 965 P.2d 433,439-40 (1998) (The court compared the benefit
to plaintiffs with the hardship to the District resulting from a permanent injunction. "The benefit
to plaintiffs is the ability to enjoy their property in a manner consistent with its rural character-to
garden, and eat outside, and keep their windows open on summer evenings. For plaintiffs, an
injunction would mean being able to use and enjoy their property as they did before the nuisance
came to them-to live, and breathe, free from a pervasive, nauseating odor." The court concluded
that the hardship to the District from the issuance of an injunction did not "greatly outweigh" the
benefit to plaintiffs, even though relocating the District's compo sting operation would be
expensive.); Sans V. Ramsey Golf & Country Club, Inc., 29 N.J. 438, 449-50, 149 A.2d 599, 606
(1959) (The court noted that the activities of defendant were "manifestly incompatible with the
ordinary and expected comfortable life in plaintiffs' home and the normal use oftheir property."
Thus, defendant was required to relocate the ladies' and men's third tees. "Such relief, in our
opinion, does not represent a burden disproportionate to the travail which would be suffered by
plaintiffs and their family through the perpetuation of the present [activities ofthe defendant.].");

Hilliard v. Shuff, 285 So.2d 266, 266-67 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (The evidence in an action to enjoin
a truck stop owner from operating fuel storage tanks near the property of an adjoining property
owner supported the trial court's finding that the only way to abate the nuisance was to remove
the tank away from the property of plaintiff 150 feet and there to vent them.); Omega Chern. Co.,

Inc. v. United Seeds, Inc., 252 Neb. 137, 149,560 N.W.2d 820, 829 (1997) (The district court
chose the most equitable means through which plaintiffs property could be restored and repaired
when it ordered defendant to completely remove its grain bin.)

23

This Court's standard of review regarding a grant or denial of an injunction is abuse of
discretion. Millerv. Bd. o/Trustees, 132 Idaho 244, 245-46,970 P.2d 512,513-14 (1998). To
detennine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers (1) whether the trial
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. Nampa Charter School, Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23, 29,89 P.3d 863, 869 (2004).
Based upon the record ofthis case, the thorough factual findings, extensive analysis and legally
sound conclusions oflaw support this Court's detennination that the trial court acted well within
its discretion in granting this mandatory injunction.
C.

The district court properly granted a pennanent injunction to eliminate the cumulative effect
of the issues constituting this private nuisance by prohibiting Christens ens from relocating
the fabric building, centralizing Christens ens ' horse operation and driving or allowing
vehicles not owned by Christensens to be driven; on any portion of Christensens' property
that lies west ofMcVicars' property.
The prior analysis and discussion pertaining to the trial court's grant of a mandatory

injunction applies with equal force to the trial court's grant of a pennanent injunction prohibiting
Christensens from (i) relocating the fabric building (ii) centralizing Christensens' horse operation
and (iii) driving or allowing vehicles not personally owned by Christensens to be driven; on
Christensens' property that lies west ofMcVicars' property. The district court again properly
balanced the equities in ordering the Christensens to limit traffic on the Christensens' property
west of the McVicars' property to vehicles which are personally owned by the Christens ens. The
record is replete with testimony and exhibits that demonstrate the extent to which vehicular and
pedestrian traffic from hay sales to the public and from other users of the building associated
with Christensens' horse operation creates unreasonable traffic, dust, fumes and noise and
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unreasonably interferes with McVicars' reasonable enjoyment of their home and lives. The
district court clearly sought an equitable middle ground between the parties as the court did not
prohibit all traffic, but rather just placed reasonable limitations on the traffic. In this way, the
Christensens will be able to make reasonable use ofthis area without being a nuisance. As was
stated above, "[t]he district court has the latitude to seek a more equitable middle ground."

Payne, 127 Idaho at 348,900 P.2d at 1359. See also, Protokowicz v. Lesofski, 69 N.J. Super. 436,
444-45, 174 A.2d 385, 389 (Ch. Div. 1961) (While the noise and noxious fumes of the diese1motored trucks which occur there caused a condition which in another location would be
harmless (such as in a closed structure not located adjacent to a residential property), the
operation conducted by the defendants in the close proximity to residential property created a
condition which resulted in material injury to the health, ordinary comfort and normal living
habits of the plaintiffs. The court found such to be an unreasonable use of defendants' property.)

D. The district court properly found and concluded that the Right to Farm Act does not apply to
the circumstances of this case.
Christensens' argument that the RTFA protects their use of their property from being
declared a nuisance is without basis in law and fact. The trial court, citing Payne v. Skaar,
"determined that the act [RTFA] applies to the encroachment of 'urbanizing areas' and when
there have been changes in 'surrounding nonagricultural activities;' the [RTFA] does not apply
where an expanding agricultural operation is surrounded by an area that has remained
substantially unchanged." R. Vol. II, p. 280 (citation omitted).
This issue on appeal presents a question oflaw over which this Court exercises free
review. Crea, 135 Idaho at 248, 16 P.3d at 924. Applying Idaho law to the case at hand, the
district court held that Christensens' "ranch/horsing operation has expanded when the
surrounding area has remained substantially unchanged. Thus [Christensens'] reliance on the
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RFTA is unpersuasive." R. Vol. II, p. 280. The undisputed and substantial facts of record in this
case as to McVicars' lengthy occupancy of their property prior to Christensens' arrival and prior
to Christensens' intensive horse/hay sales operations support the trial court's conclusion that
RTFA does not apply to the circumstances of this case.
Christensens, however, advance additional arguments on this appeal based on 2011
amendments and additions to the RTFA, that are also without basis in law and fact. Pursuant to
Idaho Code § 73-101, no part ofthe Idaho Code is retroactive, unless expressly declared so. See

Ford v. City olCaldwell, 79 Idaho 499,508,321 P.2d 589, 594 (1958) ("No statute should be
construed to be retroactive unless such intention on the part of the legislature is clearly
expressed .... Before a statute will be given retroactive and retrospective effect, the statute itself
must contain words which indicate the legislature intended it to have such retroactive and
retrospective effect." [citations omitted]); see also, Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 448, 915
P.2d 6, 10 (1996) (No statute is retroactive unless the Legislature expressly declares that it is);
and see also, Travis v. Preston, 249 Mich. App. 338,345,643 N.W.2d 235, 240 (2002) (The
court held that amendments to the state's Right-to-Farm Act did not apply retroactively because
there was nothing in that Act that indicated an intent that the Act apply retroactively.) There has
been no showing on this record that the Idaho legislature has made such a declaration as to the
2011 amendments to the RTFA.
In addition, the relevant provisions of Section 22-4503 of the RTFA in effect at all times
relevant to this case prior to July 1,2011 and upon which the district court relied to conclude that
the RTFA does not apply in this case, have not been modified in any meaningful way by the
2011 amendments. The amended Section 22-4503 in effect today continues not to apply to
prevent a claim of nuisance unless there exist "changed conditions in or about the surrounding
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nonagricultural activities." As is most evident from this record, there have not been any such
"changed conditions," and simply, for that reason, Christensens' arguments based on the 2011
amendments to RTFA fail utterly and completely.
Christens ens also make the incredibly disingenuous argument that the 2011 RTFA
additions are a "clearer indication ofthe legislative intent" than, presumably, the legislative
intent ofthe RTFA before 2011. What makes this argument so unpersuasive is that Section 224501, that portion of the RTFA that sets forth its legislative intent from the time ofthe
codification in 1981, has remained unchanged from 1981 to the present. Moreover, as discussed
above, Section 22-4503, upon which the district court relied to conclude that the RTFA does not
apply in this case, has not been modified in any meaningful way.
Christensens' RTFA arguments on appeal are wholly without basis and merit. The Act's
intent is to address the encroachment of "urbanizing areas" and changes in "surrounding
nonagricultural activities," neither of which has occurred or is present in this case. Payne, 127
Idaho at 344,900 P.2d at 1355.
E. The district court properly found and concluded that the clean hands doctrine does not apply
to the circumstances of this case.
Christensens' have raised an issue that McVicars' conduct in this case constitutes
''unclean hands" because McVicars operated a granite business in their shop from 2003 to 2008
"with no reassurance to the trial court or anyone else that the silica dust. .. was not a threat. ..."
Appellants' Brief, p. 27. The district court took a dim view of this empty argument in finding
and concluding that no evidence had been presented to support Christensens' argument that the
McVicars' granite operation may have released silica dust into the air. R. Vol. II, p. 280-281.
John McVicars testified extensively that his business operations on their property did not
interfere with any neighbors' enjoyment oftheir lives that noise and dust were kept on site and
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that traffic was minimal. In 2008, McVicars even relocated their business. R. Vol. II., pp. 233235. Without evidence in this case of any "unconscionable" conduct or even any "unconscious
act" such as might warrant denying a party reliefin a case the doctrine cannot be involved, and,
as there is no proof to support Christensens' argument, the trial court exercised proper discretion
in not denying relief to McVicars in this case. See Gilbert v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 104
Idaho 137, 145-146,657 P.2d 1,9-10 (1983). The district court properly concluded that the clean
hands doctrine "did not change the analysis regarding its determination that [Christensens'] use
of their property constitutes a private nuisance." R. Vol. II., p. 280-281.

F. The district court properly denied Christensens' motion for an award of attorney fees and
costs at trial.
Christensens asserted in a post-trial motion for an award of attorney fees and costs that,
because the trial court dismissed McVicars' public nuisance claim Christens ens are the
prevailing party in this case. This assertion is in the face of being required to abide by the
mandatory and permanent injunction imposed against them. The trial court correctly pointed out
in its opinion on both parties' requests for fees and costs that it is "within the sound discretion of
the trial court to determine which party is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of
attorney fees." R. Vol. II, pp. 319-323 citing Costav. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 359,179 P.3d 316,
322 (2008). The trial court reviewed the criteria set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) "to guide the
court in determining which party is the prevailing party.... " and reviewed Idaho case law,
particularly, ''the three principal factors" that a trial court must take into consideration set forth in

Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 192, 191 P.3d 1107, 1112 (Ct. App. 2008), which are: (1) the final
judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought, (2) whether there were multiple
claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on
each of the claims or issues." ld.
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The trial court concluded that each party had prevailed in part and that McVicars had
succeeded in obtaining the relief sought to abate the nuisance and concluded that, "in the case at
hand there were two legitimate triable issues of fact." The trial court also concluded that under
the various legal theories asserted based on I.R.C.P. 54(d)(I)(B), 54(d)(I) and 54(e)(1) and I.e. §
12-121, Christensens had not sustained their burden to prove Christensens had prevailed or that
McVicars had pursued the case fiivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, and based
thereon, the trial court denied Christensens' motions for award of attorney fees and costs. R. Vol.
II, pp. 319-323.
Christensens' unsupported assertion that the safety of the building was primarily the
focus of the trial is a major exaggeration. Appellants' Brief at 22. The district court expressly
stated that the "Plaintiffs asserted concerns regarding the safety of the building, and questioned
whether the building should be bound to building code requirements in support of the claim of
private nuisance, as well. Because clear evidence supported the Plaintiffs' private nuisance claim
based upon the use of the Defendants' property, the Court did not rely on the evidence presented
regarding the safety of the building." R. Vol. III, p. 439, FN 33. The focus of the trial was the
McVicars' claim of nuisance, private or public, and, as the district court noted, the evidence
offered regarding the safety of the building related to the McVicars' private nuisance claim as
well as their public nuisance claim. Regardless of Christens ens ' characterization of the case, the
trial court acted properly in denying Christensens' post-trial motion for attorney fees and costs.
G.

McVicars should be awarded their attorney fees on appeal under Rules 40 and/or 41I.A.R.
and Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).
McVicars, as prevailing parties on appeal, will be entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code

§ 12-121 ,I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and I.A.R. 41(a) because Christensens filed and pursued all causes of
action on appeal fiivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. See, Keller v. Rogstad, 112
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Idaho 484, 489, 733 P.2d 705, 710 (1987). Christensens have failed on appeal to present any
significant issue regarding a question oflaw. Christensens have also failed to challenge any
findings of fact made by the district court as being unsupported by substantial evidence.
Christensens' appeal merely has disputed the district court's factual findings by pointing to conflicts
in the evidence. See, Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 576, 759 P.2d 77,82 (Ct. App. 1988).
This record gives rise to an abiding belief that Christensens did not bring the appeal in good
faith, did not present genuine issues oflaw, did not challenge the substantial evidence supporting
the trial court's decision and, therefore, brought and pursued the appeal frivolously, unreasonably
and without foundation. These circumstances merit an award of attorney fees. Minich v. Gem State
Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the record on appeal and the foregoing analyses, McVicars request that this
Court:
1. Affirm the district court's Amended Final Judgment granting a mandatory injunction
requiring Christensens to remove the fabric building from its current location on Christensens'
property; however, with respect to the provision of the Amended Final Judgment requiring that
such removal shall occur no later than August 2, 2011, McVicars further request that this Court
issue and file a remittitur with the district court that includes a directive to the district court that
compliance with said mandatory injunction shall be complete no later than six (6) months after
filing of this Court's remittitur with the district court;
2. Affirm the district court's Amended Final Judgment granting a permanent injunction
prohibiting Christensens (i) from relocating the fabric building or any portion of the fabric
building on any portion of Christens ens ' property that lies to the west of McVicars' property, (ii)
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from centralizing Christensens' horse operation on any portion of Christensens' property that lies
to the west ofMcVicars' property, and (iii) from driving vehicles that are not personally owned
by Christens ens and/or allowing vehicles that are not personally owned by Christensens to be
driven on Christensens' property that lies to the west ofMcVicars' property;
3. Affirm the district court's Amended Final Judgment that attorney fees and/or costs
related to the trial proceedings as requested by Christens ens not be awarded to Christensens; and

4. Determine that McVicars are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal under LA.R.

41 and 40.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of June, 2012.
LANDECK & FORSETH
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